

THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TRANSFORMATION: PREPARING  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS  
IN THE ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL

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General Studies

by

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14. ABSTRACT Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the Army's transformational model for manning, equipping, training, and deploying both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces. Under this modular force concept, the Army National Guard (ARNG) is now an operational reserve as opposed to a strategic reserve for fighting the wars of the United States. As an operational reserve force provider, one of the key elements the ARNG is responsible for is deployment of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). To date, there are no specific ways to implement the ARFORGEN model for the ARNG. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model? To answer this question, a focus on existing and potential problems encountered by RC units (ARNG BCTs) in implementation of the ARFORGEN model is necessary. By using these ARNG BCT ARFORGEN key attributes for success, ARNG BCT commanders can evaluate their strategies for successful implementation of the ARFORGEN model in support of the Army Campaign Plan.					
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TRANSFORMATION: PREPARING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS IN THE ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL, by MAJ Ricky A. Kimmel, Oklahoma Army National Guard, 88 pages.

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the Army's transformational model for manning, equipping, training, and deploying both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces. Under this modular force concept, the Army National Guard (ARNG) is now an operational reserve as opposed to a strategic reserve for fighting the wars of the United States. As an operational reserve force provider, one of the key elements the ARNG is responsible for is deployment of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). To date, there are no specific ways to implement the ARFORGEN model for the ARNG. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model? To answer this question, a focus on existing and potential problems encountered by RC units (ARNG BCTs) in implementation of the ARFORGEN model is necessary. By using these ARNG BCT ARFORGEN key attributes for success, ARNG BCT commanders can evaluate their strategies for successful implementation of the ARFORGEN model in support of the Army Campaign Plan.

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## ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AMOPES	Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
BCT	Brigade Combat Teams
CONUS	Continental United States
COTTAD	Contingency Operations Temporary Tour of Active Duty
CRC	Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers
FIFA	Force Integration Functional Area
1A	First Army
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
LM	Lifecycle Manning
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PGP	Power Generation Platform
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
R-Day	Reset and Train Day
RC	Reserve Component
RFF	Request for Forces
SSCRA	Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act
TTAD	Temporary Tour of Active Duty
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

[T]o deal with the challenges we will face today and tomorrow, and to sustain our volunteer Soldiers in this time of war . . . we are depending on Congressional leadership [for] . . . [p]redictable access to our Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers who have become, by necessity, our operational rather than our strategic reserve.<sup>1</sup>

Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army  
Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army

#### Introduction and Significance of Study

The purpose of this thesis is to assist Army National Guard (ARNG) Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders in formulating a strategy for successful preparation of their units in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. By reading this thesis, ARNG BCT commanders can better understand what the existing and potential problems with the ARFORGEN model are and how to focus their efforts in preparing their units in this model. This focused ARFORGEN effort is the key to making the ARNG an operational reserve force and for helping this nation win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

#### Research Questions

The primary research question of this thesis is: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model? In order to answer this question, the researcher developed secondary research questions arranged in a manner to guide the reader. The first two secondary questions that answer the primary research question are:

why did the Army choose the ARFORGEN model and what is the intent? These two initial questions provide relevance to the ARFORGEN model in the thesis introduction.

Once the thesis introduction answers the why questions, four more secondary questions are answered in the literary review chapter. These questions consist of: (1) How is the ARFORGEN model defined? (2) How is the ARFORGEN model implemented over time? (3) What are the identified problems, constraints, or issues relating to the ARFORGEN model? and (4) What are the differences between the Active Component (AC) and the ARNG in ARFORGEN implementation? The answers to these four questions form the basis for answering the ARNG BCT centric questions of: what are the manning, equipping, and training critical ARNG BCT problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN?

### Why Army Force Generation?

The National Defense Act of 1916 expanded the role of the state militias to that of the Army's primary reserve force and initiated the name National Guard for that force. Because of this Act, the National Guard is a component of the Army and is guaranteed the funding and missions associated with that role.<sup>2</sup> The Total Force Policy of 1973 further defined the role of the National Guard as part of a single integrated force.<sup>3</sup> This force was intended as a strategic reserve for use in supplying units to the Army in a timeframe that allowed for build-up, fielding, and training of units after AC units were deployed. A large build-up, short-duration major theater of war conflict was the context for this model.

On 11 September 2001, the context of major theater short-duration war using the Reserve Component (RC) as a strategic reserve was over. No longer could the Army rely

solely on its AC forces to handle the operational needs for GWOT. Because of the limited size of the AC forces and the duration of time that has been required for GWOT, a consistent and significant reliance on National Guard forces still exists today.

This consistent reliance has corresponded to more than 329,000 ARNG Soldiers being mobilized to support GWOT in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Sinai, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere. For homeland defense, the ARNG has deployed more than 120,000 Soldiers for missions including the Super Bowl, airport security, and various security operations around the country. With over 600,000 Soldiers from both AC and RC units on active duty, the Army recognizes it must transform.<sup>4</sup>

Part of this transformation includes changing the RC from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve in order to meet the demands of GWOT. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, and Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis J. Harvey, make the following point about changing the RC from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve:

With the support of the President, Congress, and the Secretary of Defense, we have developed and resourced a fully integrated plan to best serve the Nation, to deal with the challenges we will face today and tomorrow, and to sustain our volunteer Soldiers in this time of war.

To execute this plan, we are depending upon continued Congressional leadership in three areas . . . [first is] obtaining legislative authorities to assure predictable access to Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers who have become, by necessity, our operational rather than our strategic reserve.<sup>5</sup>

This need to reevaluate the role of the ARNG was made clear to all levels of government.

Before the *2006 Army Posture Statement* was published, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recognized the need for an operational reserve and issued guidelines in a 9 July 2003 memorandum that directed the services to plan for using reserve component forces on a schedule that results in only one year of mobilization out of every six years.

From these guidelines, the Army's 2005 Strategic Planning Guidance prescribes one year deployed and five years at home station for the ARNG. The AC BCT ARFORGEN guidance is one year deployed and two years home station. To implement this plan, the Army developed the ARFORGEN model using BCTs as the primary expeditionary element for the AC and ARNG.

To prepare ARNG BCTs for deployment and to provide predictability to employers, families, and Soldiers, ARNG leaders at all echelons must implement the ARFORGEN model efficiently and effectively. These leaders must be able to address the critical issues that units, families, and employers will face as a result of the new ARFORGEN model for deployment. They must be able to ensure their units can perform the same missions as their AC counterparts, while executing the missions of their respective governors and enabling their Soldiers to maintain their civilian careers.

### Assumptions

Of importance in completing this thesis is the assumption that ARNG BCTs currently identified for starting ARFORGEN continue to proceed with the ARFORGEN model without interruption by their states or other outside agencies. Another assumption is that access to all necessary ARNG BCTs and appropriate Army levels involved with the implementation of ARFORGEN is granted.

### Limitations

The difficulties in conducting this research are: (1) collecting information about the impact of ARFORGEN on ARNG BCTs without any prior testing before its implementation, (2) predicting the difficulties and successes of ARNG BCTs in the

ARFORGEN model with minimal units starting ARFORGEN (or without any ARNG units starting the ARFORGEN model before thesis completion), (3) tracking units progressing through the ARFORGEN model (while gathering and analyzing the volumes of impact statements, staff products, and implementation plans that are currently being written by all levels of the Army and the ARNG), and (4) having enough time to gather the appropriate amount of evidence. Also limiting this research is the classification of certain materials. Much of the most up-to-date information concerning ARFORGEN is classified secret and for official use only. To mitigate these problems, close coordination to gather specific information about the ARFORGEN model must involve all levels of ARFORGEN implementation to ensure classified material is not compromised.

### Delimitations

The scope of data collection for this research concentrates on ARNG problems, constraints, and issues. Data that applies to both the AC and ARNG is first evaluated based on how it applies to ARNG units. Data only applying to sister services is not intended for use in this thesis.

### Summary

The ARFORGEN model is an excellent structure for preparing forces for combat. However, there are critical issues that must be addressed to make this model successful for the National Guard. This thesis identifies the issues that are critical for success of ARNG BCTs in implementing the ARFORGEN model and analyzes these issues for solutions and recommendations. By performing these steps, one can answer the question: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model? From

these attributes, an evaluation of any strategy used by ARNG BCT commanders to successfully prepare their units in the ARFORGEN model can be achieved.

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<sup>1</sup>Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, *2006 Posture Statement*, 10 February 2006 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.army.mil/aps/06/>; Internet; accessed on 23 March 2006.

<sup>2</sup>Army National Guard, Constitutional Charter of the Guard [document on-line]; available from <https://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution/default.asp?ID=14>; Internet; accessed on 23 March 2006.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Office of the Chief of Staff, *2006 Posture Statement*.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Manning the force will be the ARNG's greatest challenge.<sup>1</sup>

COL John D. Renaud

#### Introduction

To date, the majority of literature related to ARFORGEN consists of briefings to senior Army decision makers. These briefings range from informational to statistical and or impact briefings with the status of various forces and resources currently available to begin the ARFORGEN process. A heavy reliance on these briefings as well as implementation plans, training plans, and other staff documents is therefore required because no real academic works exist relating to ARFORGEN. These high-level army documents are the basis for identifying the manning, equipping, and training problems, constraints, and issues relating to the ARFORGEN model.

#### Review of the Literature Structure

The existing literature related to ARFORGEN falls into three broad categories: informational, implementation, and the working issues that Army staffs are addressing. Informational literature concentrates on answering the questions of what ARFORGEN is and what comprises the model. Implementation literature conveys the plan on how the Army will move from the existing force generation systems to the objective state of the ARFORGEN model.

Implementation literature utilizes the force integration process of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model. Of the nine force integration functional areas (FIFAs),



only five functional areas are addressed at this time. These functional areas are: manning, equipping, training, sustaining, and funding. The literary review will focus on the manning, equipping, and training functional areas to identify the answers the question of what problems, constraints, and issues are identified with the ARFORGEN model? It is in these three areas that ARNG BCT commanders can have the most influence and impact.

### The Army Force Generation Model

The Headquarters of the Department of the Army defines ARFORGEN as “a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in reoccurring periods of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander (RCC) requirements.”<sup>2</sup> The model is a “bridge that synchronizes operational requirements and available modular unit readiness in a logical, systematic process.”<sup>3</sup> As figure 1 depicts, synchronization has four parts: (1) aligning all known mission readiness requirements into different force pools, (2) preparing units by task organizing based on mission and training, (3) coordinating schedules, resources, and readiness assessments, and (4) codifying decisions at synchronization conferences for implementation.<sup>4</sup>




Figure 1. Army Force Generation is the “Drive Train”

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN 101” (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 December 2005), slide 8.

Aligning all known mission readiness requirements into different force pools focuses resources based on progressive readiness requirements.<sup>5</sup> The ARFORGEN model consists of three different force pools. These force pools are reset and train, ready, and available. The operational cycle for AC units is three years with each force pool being one year in duration. The operational cycle for RC units is six years with each force pool being two years in duration and the available force pool consisting of one year for mobilization and one year for deployment. Forces Command (FORSCOM) synchronization conferences determine the transition from one force pool to another based on commander’s assessments and operational needs.<sup>6</sup>

The reset and train force pool is the initial force pool. The focused resource readiness requirement of this initial force pool is the unit’s baseline equipment set (see

figure 2). This force pool consists of units that have recently returned from long deployments, are unable to meet ready and available force pool capability levels, or are directed to the reset and train force pool. The inability to meet ready and available force pool levels may consist of personnel changes, equipment changes, and or reorganization due to modularity.<sup>7</sup>




Figure 2. Alignment of Requirements in Army Force Generation Force Pools

*Source:* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN 101” (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 December 2005), slide 12.

The Reset and Train Day (R-Day) is the first day of a unit’s operational cycle. The Department of the Army establishes this day by an order based on FORSCOM, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and U.S. Army Reserve Command recommendations. Recommendations look at when “ready-for-what” unit status report submissions will start, new chain-of-command key personnel are in place, and when collective training can commence.<sup>8</sup> For an identified operational mission, the latest arrival date establishes the R-Day based on backward planning from the latest arrival date. Units without an

established latest arrival date use an R-Day based on the projected entry into the available force pool.<sup>9</sup>

The ready force pool is the second ARFORGEN force pool. The focused resource readiness requirement of this second force pool is the unit's training equipment set (see figure 2). This force pool consists of units assessed as "ready" at designated training and readiness capability levels and gates. Once in the ready force pool, units initiate mission preparation and higher level collective training with higher operational headquarters. These units are available for "surge" operational requirements and can be trained, resourced, and committed (AC forces) or mobilized (RC forces) if operational needs dictate.<sup>10</sup>

The available force pool is the final ARFORGEN force pool. The focused resource readiness requirement of this third force pool is the unit's deployment equipment set (see figure 2). Units capable of performing mission execution for any Regional Combatant Commander, or homeland defense requirements for Northern Command, move into this force pool. All units who pass through the available force pool window are deployed for operational and or contingency missions, tasked for homeland defense missions (RC forces), or maintain readiness in the available force pool and conduct a mission readiness evaluation (MRE) once told to deploy. If no mission arises, Headquarters of the Department of the Army returns the unit to the reset and train force pool.<sup>11</sup>

Preparing units by task organizing based on mission and training is a two step process. First, the unit focuses against future mission(s) at the earliest possible time. This correlates to commanders transitioning their core mission essential task list to a theater

mission essential task list once assigned to a named and numbered operation.<sup>12</sup> Second, the unit organizes in one of the three Expeditionary Force Packages based on the future mission(s).<sup>13</sup> The primary expeditionary force package is the Deployment Expeditionary Force. Units task organized to execute planned operational requirements are part of the Deployment Expeditionary Force. Operational requirements include contingency operations, homeland defense, and homeland security. Alerted or already mobilized RC units fall into the Deployment Expeditionary Force.<sup>14</sup>

The Contingency Expeditionary Force consists of units that are in the available force pool but have not been task organized for an operational requirement. These units are capable of rapid deployment, but have not been alerted for deployment (for AC forces) or alerted for mobilization (for RC forces). Once Contingency Expeditionary Force units are alerted, or alerted for mobilization for RC units, they become part of the Deployment Expeditionary Force unit pool.<sup>15</sup> Ready Expeditionary Forces are task organized under a higher command. These forces train and prepare for potential future operational requirements or full spectrum operations. These units are not in the available force pool.<sup>16</sup> Figure 3 shows the generation of these expeditionary forces across the ARFORGEN process.

Coordinating schedules, resources, and readiness assessments involves all levels of command and transcends all ARFORGEN force pools. Unit schedules and resourcing for training in each force pool are contingent on obtaining answers to the questions: “Ready for What?” and “Report against What?” Commander assessments are required at the end of each force pool and are part of synchronization conference discussions. Semi-annual FORSCOM synchronization conferences must codify command decisions to

properly ensure readiness is achieved throughout the ARFORGEN process. Priority for training and resourcing is generally given to units pending missions and or deployments with the earliest latest arrival date. Figure 4 represents how this process takes place.<sup>17</sup>



Figure 3. Task Organization of Expeditionary Force Packages in Army Force Generation

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, "ARFORGEN 101" (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 December 2005), slide 13.




Figure 4. Army Force Generation Objective State Training and Readiness Strategy  
 Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN 101” (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 December 2005), slide 15.

### Army Force Generation Implementation

Implementation of the ARFORGEN model will take place in three phases. These phases consist of the current state, bridging state, and objective state.<sup>18</sup> The current state is where the Army is today with force generation. This phase is characterized by high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) driving the training, sustaining, and funding of deploying units. To move from this phase to the Bridging State phase, all risks must be mitigated and resources must be identified for all shortfalls.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 5. Forces Command Army Force Generation Bridging Strategy to Transition from the Current State to the Objective State

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN Implementation Plan, Decision Point-68 01-13v2 Briefing” (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 10 March 2006), slide 11.

The bridging state moves the Army from the current state to the objective state. This phase supports all Army campaign plan decision points under review and addresses all manning, equipping, training, and any other requirements needing resources. The end of this second phase is determined by whether a balance between requirements and capabilities is achieved.<sup>20</sup> The bridging state is depicted by the FORSCOM ARFORGEN bridging strategy (see figure 5). The objective state is the final phase of ARFORGEN implementation. Characteristics of this phase are an improved balance of capabilities with requirements for all Army forces and Army institutional processes aligned to fully support ARFORGEN.<sup>21</sup> The ARFORGEN training and readiness strategy is focused on achieving the objective state (see figure 4).



## Manning

The majority of literature existing from the Army related to manning focuses on Human Resources Command using the Lifecycle Manning (LM) model to mitigate manning issues. The LM model is the construct the Army is using to man units throughout the ARFORGEN process. The Human Resources Command must synchronize Soldier assignments to support the operational life cycle of units and to prevent the necessity of stop loss for providing stability in units.<sup>22</sup>

Other considerations of LM consist of promotions, schools, leader development, command tours, and replacements. LM is not anticipated to force changes in existing promotion regulations, but LM may impact who and when Soldiers are promoted. One example anticipated to occur using LM is the promotion of officers and noncommissioned officers who can fill positions of the next higher grade early in a unit's operational lifecycle.<sup>23</sup>

Schools in the LM model should not occur in a temporary duty enroute status. Commanders are urged to send Soldiers to noncommissioned officer schools on temporary duty orders at any time during the three year operational lifecycle and officers during the reset and train phase of ARFORGEN. The reset and train phase also applies to Soldiers wishing to participate in such leader development opportunities as warrant officer school, the United States Military Academy, flight school, and other long-term courses that entail reappointment or branch transfer. Other factors such as promotion may also apply in dealing with the LM model.<sup>24</sup>

Headquarters of the Department of the Army is currently reviewing command tours. Considerations such as extending commands from two years to three years are

being evaluated. Other considerations such as force redesign aspects for all units from brigade through corps level are involved with the current decision.<sup>25</sup>

The Human Resources Command must address replacement issues involved with the LM model for successful ARFORGEN implementation. Most of these issues involve unprogrammed losses. In most cases, units who have unexpected losses will replace these losses from within the organization. This provides upward mobility to Soldiers and keeps unit cohesion in tact. In other cases, scheduled replacement packages are given by the Human Resources Command. The Individual Replacement System is the last resort for the Human Resources Command.<sup>26</sup>

A drawback identified with LM is when to synchronize manning during a unit's operational life cycle. Analysis of the LM model has revealed that front-end synchronization solutions for manning are achievable for selected AC BCTs. But when trying back-end synchronization, nine out of twelve AC BCTs indicated serious problems with the LM model. These serious problems range from meeting the needs of Soldiers to accommodating the requirements of units.<sup>27</sup> From all of these examples, it is obvious that manning the force in ARFORGEN is difficult even for AC units.

Also identified in LM analysis is the lack of feasibility of units not using the 3:1 year operational life cycle model.<sup>28</sup> This applies to all RC units since their operational life cycle is 6:1 year. All ARNG BCTs must identify similar considerations that are addressed by the LM model in order to be successful in manning their units in the ARFORGEN model.

In addition to the LM issues identified for AC units, ARNG units have other considerations that must be addressed to successfully man BCTs. These fall into the

categories of readiness, employer support, and mobilization and demobilization. All three have unique ARNG aspects and all three are yet to be addressed sufficiently.

Part of readiness involves a seamless transition from part-time to fulltime status.<sup>29</sup> Soldiers going through this transition incur pay, benefit, and other issues not experienced by AC Soldiers. The LM model is a good first step, but a single AC-ARNG manning system is also required.

Also identified with readiness is the requirement of phased mobilization.<sup>30</sup> In some cases, ARNG units at the brigade level cannot mobilize all at once. They may be too geographically dispersed and the fulltime support may not be sufficient to handle such a mobilization. Phasing mobilization alleviates this problem, but it does not complement the ARFORGEN model for readying units.

During mobilization, issues such as medical and dental readiness impact the manning of units. Commanders must instill a greater sense of urgency during pre-mobilization medical and dental assessments to mitigate this problem.<sup>31</sup> These types of problems are easily handled, but can greatly add to manning problems for a unit.

The procedures used for enlisting Soldiers also produce manning problems. With operational life cycles being six years, enlistments must be up to eight years in duration. This must be considered due to the possibility of stop loss and other reasons pushing requirements over the six year mark. Because of this, the ARNG must examine enlistment contract language.<sup>32</sup>

Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers who are mobilized and Soldiers already in a mobilized status who are willing to extend past their two year mobilization order under such things as contingency operations temporary tour of active duty (COTTAD) and

temporary tour of active duty (TTAD), bring another ARNG unique manning aspect to readiness. Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers have the added value of not being assigned to a particular unit and therefore have the flexibility to fill vacancies without impacting unit cohesion. Soldiers without mobilization time left, who are willing to remain on active duty, may be reassigned from their current unit to another mobilized unit under the COTTAD and TTAD process. Since this is usually used for Soldiers in demobilizing units, using the COTTAD and TTAD process does not impact the unit cohesion of these demobilizing units.

To leverage Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers for manning, the ARNG must change its training program to make Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers accountable to units for individual training proficiency. For COTTAD and TTAD Soldiers, the ARNG may need to offer creative incentives to extend these Soldiers beyond the two-year mobilization tour to help support major operations.<sup>33</sup>

Employer support is essential to maintain manning within the ARNG. The Army must establish an employer outreach program that focuses on small businesses, leverages the work of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, repeatedly updates Soldiers and families on rights and responsibilities associated with the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act, and provides outreach to employers of Soldiers in critical positions. By performing these four outreach programs, the Army can greatly impact retention in the RC.<sup>34</sup>

Mobilization and demobilization issues also impact the manning of the ARNG. The ARNG may need to completely redesign the Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) to properly manage ARNG replacements.<sup>35</sup>

The ARNG may also need to evaluate systems like these and look at their pros and cons in order to make adjustments necessary for successful ARFORGEN manning.

Home station support during mobilization is another issue impacting manning. Only small rear detachments are authorized under existing mobilization orders. For company size units, one Soldier is allowed and battalions are only authorized two Soldiers to maintain rear detachment operations.<sup>36</sup> The ability to properly perform the daily functions of the unit, support families, and address employer concerns is not being handled with the existing system.

The rate at which mobilization and deployment takes place is also an issue for manning. The ARNG must minimize mobilization durations for Soldiers with special professions such as doctors and dentists so they can get back to their practices quickly. The Home Station Modified Direct Deployment Program is currently underway to help address these issues, but is only being piloted for specific types of units.<sup>37</sup>

### Equipping

Information related to equipping considerations is closely tied to sourcing. The ARNG equipping strategy is tied directly to the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The timing of this strategy is based on the Army resourcing priority list for implementation in ARFORGEN. The intent of the timing is to convert all units in a state at the same time with manning being primary followed by equipping.<sup>38</sup>

Unique to the ARNG equipping strategy is the fielding of Homeland Defense and Security equipment.<sup>39</sup> This equipment goes out to ARNG modular forces, but not necessarily to their AC counterparts. Information about what this equipment is and how it is implemented is unknown.

Specific to the ARNG is the recommendation by the Government Accountability Office that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit plans to Congress addressing ARNG equipment shortfalls. Identified in the Government Accountability Office report about ARNG shortfalls were issues such as stay-behind equipment and integration of equipment into new modular units. The Department of Defense is addressing all concerns and recommendations associated with ARNG equipping relating to shortfalls and integration into modular units, yet many issues still remain for mitigation.<sup>40</sup>

### Training

First Army (1A) is the proponent responsible for oversight to all RC training and mobilization. The role of 1A in ARFORGEN is to provide training readiness oversight to all RC forces to include branch and functional assistance, and pre- and postmobilization training, evaluation, and assistance for these forces. To do this, 1A emphasizes four aspects of RC unit training: (1) individual Soldier qualification and training, (2) collective training and qualification at crew, section, team, and squad level, (3) maneuver training from platoon to post mobilization requirements, and (4) training for command and staff leadership including multiechelon training.<sup>41</sup>

First Army executes training readiness oversight using the training readiness oversight model. As figure 6 illustrates, this model is used to move RC units from one force pool to another throughout the ARFORGEN process. A mission and conditions centered assessment is used to achieve ARFORGEN requirements at each stage. Minimum personnel and equipment metrics, commander recommendations for advancement, and the training readiness assessment are all used to achieve the mission

and conditions centered assessment for ARFORGEN. The main responsibility for 1A is the training readiness assessment, which is used to ensure the training readiness oversight model is executed properly for ARFORGEN.<sup>42</sup>




Figure 6. The Training Readiness Oversight Model Used by First Army to Successfully Evaluate Reserve Component Units Through Each Force Pool of Army Force Generation

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, First Army Training Strategy, *First Army's Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Training Strategy Draft* (Fort Gillem, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 29 March 2006), 13.

The training readiness assessment assesses a unit's ability to achieve the prescribed Army standard for mission essential task list or specific regional combatant commander's mission requirements. Because the training readiness assessment is mission and conditions based, a unit deploying in support of a peace enforcement contingency mission will have different tactical proficiency levels than a unit deploying to a full-spectrum operation. The training readiness assessment also complements mission

essential task list training by focusing unit efforts and resources by coordinating between the evaluator and the unit.<sup>43</sup>

The Army has also identified several problems and ways to mitigate those problems relating to ARNG mobilization training. Such problems as barracks space, officer and enlisted quarters, and dining facilities are historic issues and will only become worse as World War II style barracks continue to be demolished.<sup>44</sup> A plan to fix these problems entails the use of power generation platforms (PGPs) and power generation support platforms. These training sites are identified for funding to offset these historic problems and are the providers of mobilization training to RC units.

The PGPs provide power projection, combat preparation, and sustainment capabilities to the Army. They have the capability of providing life support, training, maintenance, and deployment infrastructure to BCTs and to training sets necessary for equipment training. Exportable training capabilities and their associated infrastructure are also supported by PGPs. This is done in order to provide combat training center-like training at the mobilization site. To meet deployment and redeployment needs, PGPs also provide proximate rail and air facilities.<sup>45</sup>

Power generation support platforms provide power projection, mission preparation, and sustainment capabilities like PGPs. But unlike PGPs, they focus on combat support and combat service support units.<sup>46</sup> These sites are not used for ARNG BCTs because of this combat support and combat service support focus.

### Summary

This review of ARFORGEN literature demonstrates the need for further research into the problems, constraints, and issues related to each functional area with a particular



emphasis in the area of manning. How ARFORGEN is defined and why the Army is using the ARFORGEN model is clear. ARFORGEN implementation plans are being executed and refined by all Army levels. The Department of Defense has the lead on equipping issues and their solutions. The 1A is developing solutions for the issues relating to training and is creating the infrastructure for this training. However, the ARNG does not have all the systems in place to properly man units in the ARFORGEN model and has not investigated how these systems will relate to ARFORGEN. The Army National Guard Deputy Chief of Staff G-5 for Strategic Plans and Policy said it best, “manning the force will be the ARNG’s greatest challenge.”<sup>47</sup> This thesis will identify what the critical problems, constraints, and issues are with the three functional areas of manning, equipping, and training in order to answer the question: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model? But it is the functional area of manning that must be the highest priority for investigation.

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<sup>1</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army National Guard, White Paper, *Strategic Reserve to Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, Office of the Deputy Chief Of Staff G-5, Strategic Plans and Policy, 2005), 11.

<sup>2</sup>Department of Defense, *Army Campaign Plan*, Change 4 (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff GS, 2006), Annex F, Paragraph 3b(1).

<sup>3</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN 101,” (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 December 2005), slide 7.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, slide 8.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, slide 12.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN Implementation Plan, Decision Point-68 01-13v2” (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 10 March 2006), slide: R-Day Linkages within ARFORGEN.

<sup>9</sup>Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Army Force Generation Implementation Plan* (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 26 April 2006), Annex X, Paragraph 1b.

<sup>10</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN 101,” slide 12.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>Department of Defense, *Army Campaign Plan Change 4*, Annex F. Appendix 2. Paragraph 3a.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, slide 13.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, slide 15.

<sup>18</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “ARFORGEN Implementation Plan,” slide 8.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup>Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead* [document on-line]; available from <http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/acpfaqs/UnitFocusedStabLife.html>; Internet; accessed on May 15, 2006.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, “FORSCOM Life Cycle Manning Issues” (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 21 March 2006), slide 3.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, *Strategic Reserve to Operational Force*, 10.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>National Guard Bureau, NGB IT Conference, “ARNG Modular Transformation Designs and Changes to the Tactical Communications Network Briefing” (Arlington, VA: NGB Force Management Division, 10 August 2005), slide 5.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Government Accounting Office, GAO Report for Congress GAO-06-111, *Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005), 26.

<sup>41</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, *First Army’s Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Training Strategy*, 1.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup>National Guard Bureau, *Strategic Reserve to Operational Force*, 9.

<sup>45</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, FORSCOM Collective Training Strategy. FORSCOM ATLDC Briefing (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 28 September 2005), Slide 7.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>National Guard Bureau, *Strategic Reserve to Operational Force*, 11.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Without the coherence of addressing all components of transformation, change can still take place--but it becomes something less than real transformation. The true version requires consideration of the ends, ways, and means of the organization within the strategic context.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired

#### Introduction

The research method of inputs, ends, ways, and means is the basis for answering the primary research question: How do ARNG BCT commanders successfully prepare their units in the ARFORGEN model? The inputs are the answers from the questions posed in the introduction and literary review. The thesis introduction answered the why question of the ARFORGEN model. The literary review answered the how and what questions for implementation of the ARFORGEN model and began identifying some of the problems the Army faces related to ARFORGEN in the context of the FIFA domain today. These research inputs feed the research method of this thesis.

The research method ends are the secondary research questions yet to be answered. The research ways is the analysis model used to answer the ends from an internal and external perspective. The means are the methods used for gathering information in the analysis model. By using the inputs, means, ways, and ends, ARNG BCT commanders can create a strategy for successful preparation of their units in the ARFORGEN model (see figure 7).




Figure 7. Research Method: Inputs, Ends, Ways, and Means to Answer the Thesis Question

### Research Inputs

The research inputs answered the questions: (1) Why the Army chose the ARFORGEN model? (2) How is the ARFORGEN model defined? (3) How the ARFORGEN model is implemented? and (4) What identified problems, constraints, and issues exist relating to the ARFORGEN model for the FIFA domains of manning, equipping, and training? Each of these research questions are non-ARNG centric questions. By answering these questions, one gains a broad understanding of the issues relating to the ARFORGEN model. These inputs are the foundation for moving from a general understanding of the ARFORGEN model to a more focused look at the ARFORGEN model as it specifically relates to ARNG BCTs. See table 1 for a listing of the first five secondary research questions and how they relate to AC and or ARNG centric answers.

Table 1. Research Method Inputs From Chapters 1 and 2 and Remaining Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams Centric Secondary Questions

	Question	AC	ARNG
Ch 1	Why did the Army choose the ARFORGEN model and what is the intent?	✓	✓
	How is the ARFORGEN model defined?	✓	✓
Ch 2	How is the ARFORGEN model going to be implemented over time?	✓	✓
	What identified problems, constraints, or issues exist relating to the ARFORGEN model?	✓	✓
	What are the differences between AC and ARNG in ARFORGEN implementation?	✓	✓
	What are the critical ARNG BCT manning problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN?		✓
	What are the critical ARNG BCT equipping problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN?		✓
	What are the critical ARNG BCT training problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN?		✓

### Research Means

Research ends are accomplished using research means. These means include interviews and documentation supplied as a result of these interviews. Interviews with the Department of the Army, NGB, FORSCOM, 1A, and the states will answer the secondary research questions. Coordination with all levels of the Army must take place to implement these means.

### Research Ways

A strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats analysis is the “way” for answering the research ends. Strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats analysis is a model used to evaluate organizations by looking at the strengths and weaknesses internal to the organization, opportunities and threats external to the organization.<sup>2</sup> For this thesis, the ARNG BCT is the organization and the answers to the research ends will consist of both internal and external perspectives. To better understand how an ARNG BCT can

utilize the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats analysis model, a comparison of business factors and ARNG factors is illustrated in table 2.

Table 2. Comparison of Business Factors versus Army National Guard Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats

Business	ARNG
<b>STRENGTHS:</b>	
Core Competencies	ARNG BCT Core Competencies
Distinctive Competencies	ARNG BCT Distinctive Competencies
Advantages	ARNG BCT Advantages
Unique Resources	ARNG BCT Unique Resources
<b>WEAKNESSES:</b>	
Improvement Areas	ARNG BCT Mission Critical Deficiencies
Avoidance Areas	ARNG BCT Non-mission Critical Distracters
Competitor Perceived Weaknesses	ARNG BCT Perceived Weaknesses (from Army community)
<b>OPPORTUNITIES:</b>	
Traditional Market Opportunities	Traditional ARNG Opportunities
Business Trends	New Army/ARNG Trends
Competitor Slow Movers	Immerging Army/ARNG Strategies
<b>THREATS:</b>	
Obstacles	Army/ARNG negative policies, programs, directives
Competitors	Outside ARNG BCT units (needing similar resources)
Changes	Army/ARNG policy, program, directive changes

Strengths are all internal factors that an ARNG BCT can leverage to successfully prepare itself in the ARFORGEN model. One of the perspectives in determining internal factors is how an ARNG BCT compares itself with an AC BCT. If an ARNG BCT is good at small unit tactics, but an AC BCT is proficient at this as well, then this is not a strength. By this definition, a distinctive strength is an ARNG BCT “unique” strength.

For this thesis, the strength internal factors consist of: (1) core competencies, (2) distinctive competencies, (3) advantages, and (4) unique resources for ARNG BCTs.



Core competencies are activities that an ARNG BCT is most proficient at performing. Distinctive competencies are activities that ARNG BCTs perform better than AC BCTs. Advantages are characteristics that enable ARNG BCTs to outperform AC BCTs. Unique resources are outside enablers that ARNG BCTs possess and AC BCTs do not possess. Determining these four criteria enables the strength analysis to succeed from all perspectives.

Weaknesses are all the internal factors that detract from successfully preparing an ARNG BCT in the ARFORGEN model. Again, one of the perspectives for analyzing weaknesses is how an ARNG BCT compares to its AC counterpart. From this perspective, the researcher can ask questions such as: what weaknesses are perceived outside the ARNG or what competencies do the AC BCTs have that ARNG BCTs do not have in order to determine ARNG BCT weaknesses?

The research analysis addresses the internal weakness factors of improvement areas, avoidance areas, and areas that the Army community sees as weaknesses. Improvement areas are activities that ARNG BCTs recognize as deficiencies. Avoidance areas are nonmission critical activities that ARNG BCTs must minimize resource allocation toward in order to prevent misuse of resources. Army community perceived weakness areas are mission critical activities that the Army community views as necessary for ARNG BCTs to be successful.

Opportunities are all external factors that are leveraged to successfully prepare an ARNG BCT in the ARFORGEN model. This perspective looks at the effects that Armywide policies, strategies, and trends have on ARNG BCTs. One question to ask in determining opportunities is: What opportunities exist for my ARNG BCT due to

changes in Army policies, strategies, and trends? Because opportunities are perishable, only the most lasting opportunities will be considered for this thesis.

Opportunity external factors for this thesis consist of: (1) traditional ARNG opportunities, (2) new Army trends, (3) new ARNG trends, (4) emerging Army strategies, and (5) emerging ARNG strategies. Traditional ARNG opportunities are opportunities that have historically existed for the ARNG. New Army trends focus on opportunities related to doctrine and technology. New ARNG trends also focus on doctrine and technology, but from an ARNG perspective. Emerging Army strategies are new Army policies, programs, and directives that impact ARNG BCTs. Emerging ARNG strategies are new ARNG policies, programs, and directives that impact ARNG BCTs. Analyzing these five factors along with eliminating ARNG BCT weaknesses help in determining the key success factors necessary for ARFORGEN implementation.<sup>3</sup>

The threats are all external factors that negatively impact successfully preparing an ARNG BCT in the ARFORGEN model.<sup>4</sup> These threat factors consist of obstacles, competitors, and changes relating to Army and ARNG policies, programs, and directives that affect ARNG BCTs. Obstacles are existing Army and ARNG policies, directives, and programs that hinder the ARNG BCT mission or if modified, would make mission accomplishment easier. Competitors are other Army or ARNG units that compete for resources with ARNG BCTs. Changes are Army and ARNG policies, programs, and directives that are being instituted that hinder the ARNG BCT mission or if modified, would make mission accomplishment easier.

### Research Ends

The “ends” are the secondary research questions that answer the thesis question (see figure 7). In the review of the literature, differences between the AC and RC ARFORGEN implementation were defined. Based on these differences, secondary research questions were formulated for each FIFA domain selected (see table 1). The answers to these ARNG BCT centric questions produce the “ends” necessary for creating a strategy for an ARNG BCT commander to be successful in the ARFORGEN model.

### Summary

Using inputs, ends, ways, and means will guide one to the answer of: how do ARNG BCT commanders successfully prepare their units in the ARFORGEN model? This research method identified the secondary questions as research ends that are used to formulate tertiary questions in chapter 4. By answering these tertiary questions, one can craft a strategy that addresses how to successfully prepare ARNG BCTs in the ARFORGEN model.

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<sup>1</sup>Jack D. Kem, “Military Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means” [article on-line]; available from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/kem.html>; Internet; accessed on 25 October 2006.

<sup>2</sup>A. A. Thompson, J. E. Gamble, and A. J. Strickland III, *Strategy: Winning in the Marketplace: Core Concepts, Analytical Tools, Cases* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 85.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

This chapter emphasizes the analysis of the manning FIFA and the equipping and training FIFAs both associated and not associated with manning. It uses the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats analysis format explained in chapter 3 to analyze the manning FIFA and associated equipping and training impacts. For the equipping and training issues not associated with manning, this chapter uses only a general external view of opportunities and threats.

The ARNG external factors used for analysis consists of: (1) opportunities gained from Army and ARNG policies, procedures, or programs, (2) traditional ARNG opportunities gained from Army and ARNG policies, procedures, or programs, (3) Army policy, procedures, or programs that hinder (threaten) ARNG BCT ARFORGEN implementation and execution, and (4) threats to ARNG BCT ARFORGEN implementation or execution due to competition for resources. The internal ARNG factors consists of: (1) ARNG BCT competencies that increase (strengthen) the ability to implement and execute ARFORGEN, (2) ARNG BCT advantages or unique resources that increase (strengthen) the ability to implement or execute ARFORGEN, (3) deficiencies or distracters that weaken the ability of ARNG BCTs in implementing or executing ARFORGEN, and (4) obstacles or setbacks to implementing or executing ARFORGEN generated from perceived internal weaknesses in an ARNG BCT. From these external and internal ARNG factors, this chapter forms several tertiary questions to answer the secondary questions of: What are the (manning, equipping, and training)

problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN that were identified as research question inputs?

### Manning

Two tertiary questions address the ARNG external factor of: what ARNG BCT ARFORGEN manning opportunities are gained from Army and ARNG policies, procedures, or programs? The first question asks what existing manning policies, procedures, or programs are contributing to the success of implementing or executing ARFORGEN. The second question asks: What new manning policies, procedures, or programs are being investigated to successfully implement or execute ARFORGEN for ARNG BCTs? Both questions entail answers from several perspectives.

FORSCOM, Adjutant General, and ARNG BCT interviews answered the first question addressing what manning opportunities are evident from existing Army and ARNG policies, procedures, or programs. From the FORSCOM perspective, just the process of reviewing ARNG policies, procedures, and programs is contributing to the success of ARFORGEN.<sup>1</sup> This perspective identified several issues such as key leader assignments during ARFORGEN and the cross-leveling of Soldiers between ARNG BCTs as not just a concern for the states and ARNG, but also a concern of the Army as a whole.

FORSCOM is currently looking at several courses of action to address key leader assignments. The primary course of action being investigated utilizes the R-Date concept in the reset and train phase.<sup>2</sup> This course of action creates two R-Dates for ARNG BCTs. The first R-Date is the date defined in the ARFORGEN model which entails the official

order designating an ARNG BCT starting the reset and train phase in ARFORGEN. This first R-Date is the date described in the current ARFORGEN implementation plan.

The second R-Date is a date that unofficially recognizes a reset of key leadership in the ARNG BCT about half way through the ARFORGEN process. This half-way point is between three and four years and is contingent on variables such as when key leaders assumed their positions, the mission the ARNG BCT is resourced against, and other factors such as retention, career progression, and availability of new key leaders. The intent of this second R-Date is to make the leadership transition of the ARNG BCT to coincide with the transition from the ready force pool to the availability force pool and carry the new leadership through the ARNG BCT deployment.

FORSCOM is also addressing the Soldier cross-leveling issue between ARNG BCTs. Products such as the NGB Availability Model are used by FORSCOM to develop cross-leveling plans in accordance with National Guard guidance and recommendations.<sup>3</sup> The intent of using the NGB Availability Model is to keep all Soldier cross-leveling between ARNG BCTs (when the ARNG BCT's state cannot resource itself) in the same Availability Model fiscal year, then prioritize cross leveling based on ready-for-what requirements.

The Army and ARNG are increasing coordination efforts more than ever before. For example, before FORSCOM determines which ARNG BCTs are given which missions, NGB staffs cross-level contingencies with input from the states. This new process helps prevent unnecessary issues with manning and helps build systems to address future manning problems between the ARNG and FORSCOM. In turn, the Army

can now take better steps to resource the ARNG because of this increased coordination resulting from ARFORGEN.

State Adjutants General have also seen manning opportunities gained from existing Army and or ARNG policies, procedures, and programs that help in the success of ARNG BCTs in ARFORGEN. One such opportunity comes from the increased availability of high OPTEMPO money to units in the ARFORGEN model. This has increased the ability of states to provide the necessary resources for programs and other initiatives that help recruiting and retention. However, this opportunity is limited. The OPTEMPO money is currently tied to specific unit identification codes which may prevent states from sending the funds to high-OPTEMPO and low-density military occupational specialty units that can really benefit from these funds.

From an ARNG BCT perspective, the existing manning policies, programs, and procedures providing opportunities for ARNG BCTs in the ARFORGEN model consist of more liberal requirements for new recruits and deployment and redeployment Soldier programs.<sup>4</sup> The recently directed changes in the requirements for new recruits have increased recruiting for not only the Army, but the ARNG BCTs as well. These changes are providing flexibility to recruiters and have increased the pool of available recruits for these recruiters.

Some of these changes consist of waivers for previous drug use, lower high school drop out restrictions, decreased minimum aptitude scores, and changing the maximum age for recruits from thirty-five to thirty-nine years of age. ARNG BCTs are noticing an increased flow of recruits as a result of these changes, but are uneasy with the potential effects from these more liberal recruiting standards.<sup>5</sup> Time will tell whether

these Army recruiting policies will remain an opportunity by increasing unit strength or end up being a threat to retention of good Soldiers.

Army deployment and redeployment programs such as the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act (SSCRA), Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), and the ability to enter active duty through COTTAD, TTAD, and full-time support opportunities are providing for Soldier welfare and are increasing retention at the ARNG BCT level. GWOT veterans, their families, and ARNG Soldiers are recognizing the significance of these Army and ARNG programs and legal protections. By providing the ability to lower double-digit interest rates to 6 percent with the SSCRA, Soldiers and their families have an instant increase in discretionary funds once mobilized.

Another noticeable protection for Soldiers under the SSCRA is the ability to save a mortgage even after a significant decrease in income. Soldiers with civilian professions that exceed their Army income are enjoying the assurance that their home will not be taken away even if they are unable to pay the mortgage. Payment arrangements, protections to credit, and even waivers of mortgage payments can be arranged because of the SSCRA. These Soldiers are in the minority, but are usually in key positions for the ARNG and are more difficult to replace than most Soldiers.

In addition to deployment opportunities through the SSCRA, the USERRA redeployment opportunities that exist for retention are also noticeable. The protection this law provides is especially noticed by Soldiers with a skilled trade and Soldiers working in the civil service sector. Most Soldiers do not experience immediate firing after redeployment. However, the residual effects such as missed promotion opportunities and raises do happen frequently. Because of USERRA, most employers try to cooperate with



the redeployed Soldier (and in some cases with the Soldier's spouse or family member before redeployment) in order to avoid a conflict with this law. Some employers, however, still attempt to penalize ARNG Soldiers who are mobilized.

For Soldiers wishing to postpone the return to their civilian job, the COTTAD, TTAD, and full-time support policies for remaining on active duty are available.<sup>6</sup> This option for further military duty is on the rise. Many Soldiers returning from deployments are requesting to stay on active duty and families are recognizing the benefits of active duty from their deployment experience.

ARNG BCTs and other Army units also benefit from these policies. Even if a Soldier leaves an ARNG BCT as a result of COTTAD or TTAD, the opportunity related to ARFORGEN is noticed by an increase in the available pool of Soldiers for cross-leveling. Increases in the manning resources for units training ARNG BCTs (such as Training Support Brigades) are also evident. With experienced ARNG trainers training ARNG units at PGPs and other mobilization stations, future deploying ARNG BCTs can better prepare themselves for deployment. More examples of COTTAD and TTAD benefits and opportunities may also present themselves once this policy is better implemented.<sup>7</sup>

Many Soldiers are also taking advantage of full-time support opportunities both during an ARNG unit deployment and after redeployment. ARNG BCT rear detachment duties are being recognized as an integral part for the welfare and retention of Soldiers and their families. Policies such as Title 32 Temporary Technician Support and over Modified Table of Organization and Equipment manning mobilizations are used to provide Soldiers for rear detachments.<sup>8</sup> NGB is working hard to provide more manning

resources through the Title 32 Temporary Technician Support program and FORSCOM is approving mobilization orders with manning requirements above Modified Table of Organization and Equipment levels to help address this necessity.

The second ARNG BCT ARFORGEN opportunity question asked what new manning policies, procedures, or programs are being investigated to successfully implement or execute ARFORGEN for ARNG BCTs. Addressing this issue was both FORSCOM and NGB. FORSCOM is establishing programs and procedures that coordinate collective training with the funding and resourcing needs of ARNG BCTs related to individual training and schools for units in the reset and train force pool.<sup>9</sup> The intent of these programs and procedures is to front-load training and school slots for ARNG BCTs in the reset and train fiscal year(s). By providing the opportunities of additional front-loaded training and school slots and the necessary resourcing for these slots, ARNG BCTs can ensure that they get their Soldiers prepared for their positions and or receive the necessary military occupational specialty training for military occupational specialty qualification.

The role NGB is playing in new manning opportunities provided by the ARFORGEN model also pertains to schools as well as other resourcing issues. Because the availability model is coordinated with the states and depicts which units are in which phases of ARFORGEN and when, NGB is able to get school allocations front-loaded for units in reset and train in coordination with TRADOC. This depiction of units in the availability model increases situational awareness for commanders and allows conflict resolution between states when trying to resource for the POM.<sup>10</sup>

Also analyzed was the external theme of opportunities gained from traditional ARNG manning policies, procedures, or programs. One such traditional ARNG policy is the flexibility given to unit commanders in determining how to man their units. This policy is becoming one of the key factors for ARNG BCT success in ARFORGEN.<sup>11</sup>

Traditionally, ARNG commanders are allowed maximum initiative in creating solutions to manning needs. In the ARFORGEN model, this policy is being leveraged because the process of determining manning needs for all ARNG BCT units is proving to be very complex.<sup>12</sup> ARFORGEN is forcing ARNG BCT commanders (as well as their subordinate commanders) to generate personnel progression and development programs by-name in order to properly manage how to fill all key leadership positions throughout the ARFORGEN model. The process of creating these personnel progression systems is providing greater opportunities for articulating professional development plans of action for all Soldiers and providing staffs with the ability to recommend how to properly man units. Such opportunities not only help in the manning process, but also increase retention of Soldiers.

Counter to the opportunities are the threats caused by existing or new Army and ARNG manning policies, procedures, and programs in ARNG BCTs implementing and executing ARFORGEN. The existing Army and ARNG policies, procedures, or programs that threaten the success of implementation and execution of the ARFORGEN model in the area of manning were analyzed from the Adjutant General, NGB, and ARNG BCT perspectives. The Adjutant General perspective sees existing mobilization procedures as one of the biggest hindrances to ARNG BCTs successfully implementing and executing the ARFORGEN model in the manning area.<sup>13</sup> Current problems with timely alerting and

mobilization of units and Soldiers are creating difficulties for ARNG units, Soldiers, families, and employers. Once deployed, the existing replacement system for manning ARNG units prevents the use of existing ARNG volunteer systems and causes states to pursue other alternatives to help their deployed units and care for their Soldiers.<sup>14</sup> These issues must be resolved to successfully implement and execute ARFORGEN. However, the question remains: Do the mobilization and ARFORGEN processes complement or conflict with each other?

This same analysis on mobilization procedures is shared from the NGB perspective and of particular concern is the Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).<sup>15</sup> According to AMOPES, mobilization is the process of selecting RC Soldiers and units for active federal service, preparation and training of these Soldiers and units for assigned missions, and delivery of these Soldiers and units to their active duty assignments. Mobilization is accomplished by: (1) receiving and interpreting requirements, (2) identifying preferred units for missions, (3) alerting identified Soldiers and units, (4) bringing identified Soldiers and units onto active duty (mobilizing), (5) training, equipping, validating mobilized Soldiers and units, and (6) delivering these Soldiers and units to appropriate duty locations.<sup>16</sup> All of these steps must complement the ARFORGEN process for successful implementation and execution.

The mobilization process begins with the Combatant Commander identifying a requirement and forwarding this requirement as a request for forces (RFF) to FORSCOM. FORSCOM then sources the request with available AC and or RC units. If a RC unit is identified, FORSCOM requests a mobilization action from the Department of the Army Military Operations – Office of Deployment and Mobilization. The

mobilization action is approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and an alert order is published after Congress is notified. After Congress is notified, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs publishes a mobilization order for the unit (see figure 8).




Figure 8. Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System Unit Mobilization Process

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, "Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System" Draft (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 2006), 9-10.

Within this process is the additional requirement of Secretary of Defense approval for all units supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. If FORSCOM requests a mobilization action for a RC unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, Department of the Army Military Operations--Office of Deployment and Mobilization must present the list of RC units to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for Secretary of Defense approval. With these numerous agencies and approval steps for mobilization, the potential for alert and mobilization order delays is increased if not properly synchronized with the ARFORGEN process. This process may need to change to prevent the delays that are negatively impacting unit, Soldier, family, and employer wellbeing and contributing to manning issues for the ARNG.

The existing replacement system used by FORSCOM is another Adjutant General manning issue that needs to be resolved.<sup>17</sup> The current FORSCOM system creates pools of replacements to be sent to Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers (CRCs) and then to whatever ARNG unit needing replacements in theater. This process is diminishing the volunteer rate of ARNG Soldiers in supporting units from their state.

To mitigate this problem, states are leveraging internal processes for getting replacements. ARNG units in theater call back to home station and do by-name requests, then put these Soldiers in a “late mobilization arrival” status to the mobilization station. Once at the mobilization station as a “late arrival,” the Soldier goes through only the mobilization training the requesting unit participated in, and then deploys directly after completing this training. This process works well for ARNG replacement needs, but it also places an extra burden on the mobilization assistance team cells at mobilization

stations.<sup>18</sup> A better solution to the ARNG replacement issue is necessary. Systems like these are not appropriate for an Army of One and need to be resolved.

The ARNG BCT perspective also sees existing mobilization procedures as a hindrance, but mainly in the area of mobilization time limits.<sup>19</sup> Soldiers in the ARNG not only support the fact they are mobilized, but are willing and able to extend past their two year commitment. Soldiers and their families have already established full integration into the active duty role by the end of two years, and in many cases arrangements with employers are possible for continued service after this two-year period. Some observers notice that the longer ARNG Soldiers and their families remain on active duty, the more willing they are to continue active duty service when the mission is important.

ARNG BCTs see COTTAD and TTAD as opportunities for the ARNG to gain additional manning resources.<sup>20</sup> However, if mobilization time limits are not flexible enough to enable Soldiers to transition to COTTAD and or TTAD status without a stop in service, a threat to losing these potential manning resources may occur. Stops in service mean stops in income and benefits. Soldiers and their families need assurances to prevent the negative impacts of these possible noncomplementary systems (Mobilization, COTTAD, and TTAD).

ARNG BCTs also see the lack of command input in time limits as a constraint on planning and a liability to accomplishing the mission. The GWOT is called the “long war,” but mobilization time limits are not long. Soldiers, families, and employers are all the beneficiaries of the GWOT and with this comes the responsibility to support the nation. An evaluation of mobilization time limits is necessary and changes in policies,

procedures, and even laws should occur to help fight the GWOT by allowing ARNG Soldiers to remain on active duty for extended periods on a volunteer basis.

From the NGB perspective, the rigidity of the POM cycle process is not allowing for near-term forecasting to take place from ARNG BCTs. ARNG BCTs are trying to understand their needs at the same time they are learning how to be whatever new modular unit they are becoming.<sup>21</sup> Most of the ARNG BCTs are changing due to modularity. The impacts of limited time for planning and the lack of institutional knowledge in the ARNG of simultaneous major equipment fielding initiatives (due to the ARNG traditionally not being equipped like their AC counterparts) is causing units to not properly forecast training needs. This is affecting the ability of Soldiers becoming qualified in their new jobs and thus manning is effected. Either flexibility in the POM cycle process may be necessary or institutional training in the ARNG down to the ARNG BCT level may need to be created to mitigate this systemic problem.

Manning threats from new Army and ARNG policies, procedures, and programs, were also analyzed. From the ARNG BCT perspective, the way new equipment fielding is conducted has the potential of effecting Soldier retention and needs to be addressed.<sup>22</sup> Currently, program managers are directing who gets which equipment and when it is received, all without any type of scheduled system for ARNG BCTs to follow. This ad hoc system of equipment fielding is resulting in frustrated Soldiers and prevents commanders from creating appropriate plans to mitigate their frustration. This Army system of fielding equipment may also need to be altered in order to prevent an impact to unit climate.



The last question involved with external analysis was determining the threats to ARNG BCT ARFORGEN implementation and execution due to competition for manning resources. This was analyzed from the ARNG BCT perspective. Improvements are necessary in the RFF and time phased forces deployment document procedures to mitigate conflicts in manning for alerted ARNG BCTs.<sup>23</sup> If procedures are established to prioritize ARNG BCTs who are alerted for deployment by RFFs and or time phased forces deployment documents at similar times, ARNG BCT commanders can give guidance as to who will be the receiver and who will be the donor units for meeting manning needs.<sup>24</sup> Solutions such as these are presenting themselves as a result of what is perceived to be a system of alerting more than one type of ARNG BCT for the same deployment cycle with the full knowledge that the number of ARNG BCTs requested cannot be manned. Again, another look at Army mobilization and resourcing is necessary to prevent ARFORGEN distracters.

In addition to external themes of manning, four internal manning questions were analyzed. The first question asks what ARNG BCT competencies increase (strengthen) the manning capabilities to implement or execute ARFORGEN. Most notable is the way ARNG BCTs (and the ARNG in general) leverage the community when deploying and redeploying.<sup>25</sup> ARNG communities follow the happenings and whereabouts of “their” units. Whenever units deploy and redeploy, local officials, clergy, and media show up for the event. Such activities not only provide a sense of pride for Soldiers and their families, but also help with mitigating the potential problems of reintegration with employers.

Another significant competency that is unique to the ARNG is civilian experience and expertise.<sup>26</sup> This competency does not directly improve manning, but it does allow

ARNG Soldiers to demonstrate their proficiency in a variety of missions which correlates to a better sense of pride and an increased level of importance to the organization. While performing their military missions, these Soldiers quickly learn their military duties by integrating and leveraging their civilian experiences into these duties in their day-to-day activities. By going through these experiences, Soldiers gain increased levels of morale and can be better retained.

The third significant competency that is unique to the ARNG is how Guardsmen do more with less.<sup>27</sup> Competencies in training effectively despite limited training time, limited or nonexistent equipment, and shortages in manning have been developed in order to meet the demands of the Army. Because ARFORGEN is in the bridging phase of implementation, this competency must be leveraged in order to prevent frustrations that cause a negative impact on manning and for ARNG BCT commanders to be successful in providing the necessary transformational leadership necessary to execute ARFORGEN.

The second internal manning question asks what ARNG BCT advantages or unique resources exist that increases the manning capabilities to implement and execute ARFORGEN. Although the ARNG does not have a military community that the AC finds for its families on post, it does have a community. The ARNG is still a small town organization. Soldiers, families, employers, and civic leaders call the local ARNG unit “their unit.” Business owners consistently provide support to their local ARNG unit, and this unique resource is utilized in several ways.

One way local businesses are used is for direct support to the unit. Businesses often donate their facilities, funds, and even people to support ARNG events. Some of these events include facilities for military functions, volunteering time to support unit

blood drives, and funds for unit Christmas parties. These activities prove to be beneficial to the ARNG and their supporting businesses by providing support to both by the public.

Local businesses also provide direct support to ARNG units by providing employment opportunities to Soldiers. On many occasions, employers give preference to ARNG Soldiers over their civilian counterparts because they know the Soldier's commander, his leaders or the reputation of the unit. Commanders have influence in communities and can help take care of their Soldiers both on and off duty. This translates to recruiting and retention increases because of the fact that being in the ARNG not only supports the country, but also provides benefits to ARNG Soldiers and their families.

The third and fourth internal questions relate to deficiencies or distracters and perceived weaknesses that ARNG units face for manning. The question of what deficiencies or distracters do ARNG BCTs have to contend with that weaken manning for implementation and execution of ARFORGEN relate to the fact ARNG Soldiers are wearing the uniform on a part-time basis. Issues such as equipment maintenance, time constraints for planning, job conflicts, and properly forecasting resources are all systemic problems ARNG BCT commanders face.

Equipping impacts associated with manning exist due to a combination of part-time Soldier status and unit conversions.<sup>28</sup> Discussed earlier was the impact that equipment fielding is having on manning, but the maintenance of equipment once assigned to the unit is an internal impact. Part-time Soldiers have limited opportunities to get new equipment training, which impacts maintenance. Full-time ARNG Soldiers have other full-time responsibilities other than maintenance, even if they were capable of performing maintenance on all pieces of equipment. Commanders struggle with the

demands of maintenance and often times have to decide between training, Soldier satisfaction, and maintenance within the limited drill weekend. This conflict causes frustration with Soldiers and at times impacts retention.

Time constraints for planning are another part-time Soldier reality.<sup>29</sup> When planning is not adequate, preparation and execution often fails. Commanders and their leaders become frustrated which erodes unit climate and morale. This impacts manning because Soldiers do not want to be in organizations that are not successful. Add this traditional ARNG challenge with the new ARFORGEN and modularity demands and frustration increases if not managed properly.

Even more difficult for ARNG leaders to mitigate are the inevitable job conflicts that result with increased ARNG BCT OPTEMPO.<sup>30</sup> More and more is expected of ARNG Soldiers today and as such, more is expected from their employers. This causes conflicting loyalties. Soldiers are in most cases patriotic and personalize their sense of duty to their country. Good employees are also loyal to their employers. This conflict adds stress to Soldiers' lives which often results in some dedicated Soldiers leaving the unit because they are conscientious.

Finally, properly forecasting the funds for ARNG BCTs going through ARFORGEN is not being accomplished due in part to deficiencies in execution.<sup>31</sup> Partly due to ignorance, and mostly due the impacts of modularity while going through ARFORGEN discussed earlier, ARNG BCTs do not have their forecasting requirements in synch with the POM cycle which in turn impacts the funds necessary for school training slots. The current POM cycle being resourced is Fiscal Year 2008 to 2013. Many of the ARNG BCTs do not have the funds they need for training Soldiers on the new

positions modularity is creating. Already discussed is the program FORSCOM developed for front loading schools in the reset and train phase. It is up to ARNG BCTs and their states to properly forecast the necessary funds for these schools in conjunction with the POM cycle in order for manning not to be impacted and to be successful in ARFORGEN.

The question of what perceived weaknesses exist in ARNG BCTs that create negative impacts on manning was also asked. Perception sometimes creates reality. Historically, the AC and the public perceive ARNG units and their Soldiers as less qualified to perform the missions required of the military. From this perception comes the reality of less money and fewer resources to perform military operations. This has exacerbated tensions between the ARNG and the AC which sometimes causes an “inferiority complex” within the ranks of the ARNG.

When ARNG units receive less funding and fewer resources, training is negatively impacted. When training is negatively impacted, both Soldier and unit performance is negatively impacted. When performance is poor, negative perceptions are increased and the cycle starts all over again. This cycle leads to impacts negatively effecting manning for an operational ARNG force.

### Equipping

The equipping issues not associated with the manning FIFA are mostly a direct result of unit conversion being executed during ARFORGEN. These issues are posing a threat to ARFORGEN by causing training distractors.<sup>32</sup> ARNG BCTs and their divisions are desperately trying to manage the influx of new equipment and are putting the management process of modularizing their ARNG BCTs as first priority. This process is not allowing any time for the average Soldier to even think about ARFORGEN. To make

ARFORGEN successful, Soldiers must be influenced to accept the model before they are reacting to it or questioning the legitimacy of the ARFORGEN process in general.

### Training

Unlike the manning and equipping FIFA, the training issues not associated with the manning FIFA are overwhelmingly positive. The opportunities gained by ARFORGEN in the area of training encompass everything from individual to unit level training and help focus resources from all echelons of the Army.<sup>33</sup> Individual Soldiers benefit from the increased emphasis on preparing all ARNG Soldiers for operations. This increased emphasis allows for better preparedness by defining exactly what is expected of each Soldier and when during the ARFORGEN process.

Leader training also benefits from the ARFORGEN model. ARNG leaders are now given the ability to really perform battle focused training. The “Ready for What” emphasis in the ARFORGEN model allows leaders to focus their training on the mission that unit is assigned.<sup>34</sup> This includes cultural, custom, and even language training that previously would be done only at the mobilization station.

Like leader training, unit level training can also be battle focused. Knowing the possible mission or missions the unit will perform in advance gives purpose to that unit. Plans, exercises, and staff rides can be coordinated to compliment the mission(s) assigned to the unit. Purposeful training motivates everyone toward a common goal and this allows, with the proper leadership, the unit to be transformed into a new modular BCT.

However, the potential threat to training that may hinder post-mobilization training is the noncomplementary processes of ARFORGEN and AMOPES that were discussed earlier.<sup>35</sup> Mobilization begins with the Combatant Commander forwarding a

RFF to FORSCOM and FORSCOM sourcing the request with available AC and or RC units. The intent of ARFORGEN is to source the RFF from the available force pool. The conflict arises when the ready-for-what mission that was identified early in the ARFORGEN process is not the same as the actual mission identified in the RFF that requests the unit from the available force pool.

This potential conflict may drastically increase the post-mobilization training at the PGPs and cause frustration with Soldiers who have trained to the mission essential task list provided through the ARFORGEN process. If an ARNG BCT is training for a mission that is in a different theater, an understanding of the new operational environment must be established. Changes in culture, language, customs, terrain, and climate all impact how an ARNG BCT commander prepares his unit for deployment. Systems are necessary to mitigate this conflict between the AMOPES and ARFORGEN processes or Soldiers, and their leaders will begin to question the legitimacy of the ARFORGEN process. It is up to leaders to ensure legitimacy of ARFORGEN is maintained, and again this calls for transformational leadership at all levels.

### Summary

This chapter analyzed the manning, equipping, and training FIFAs with a particular emphasis on manning. Using the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats analysis format, ARNG external and internal factors were examined based on tertiary questions developed from the secondary questions posed in chapter 3. By answering the secondary and tertiary questions posed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively, one can now answer: How do ARNG BCT commanders successfully prepare their units in the ARFORGEN model? It is the “how” that will be discussed in chapter 5 with a focus on

transformational leadership as the methodology. From these recommendations, ARNG BCT commanders can formulate a strategy for successful preparation of their units in the ARFORGEN model.

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<sup>1</sup>Major General William D. Wofford, FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff (ARNG), telephone interview by the author, 12 July 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Gary McGinnus, 30th BCT Executive Officer (NC ARNG), telephone interview by the author, 26 July 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Major General William, E. Ingram, Jr., The Adjutant General of North Carolina (NCARNG) and Vice Chairman of ARFPC, telephone interview by the author, 19 July 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ingram.

<sup>9</sup>Wofford.

<sup>10</sup>Major George, L. Dukes III, ARNG ARFORGEN Implementation Plan Action Officer (NGB ARF-F), telephone interview by the author, 29 August 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>11</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ingram.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Dukes.

<sup>16</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, "Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System" Draft (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 2006), 9-10.

<sup>17</sup>Ingram.



<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Dukes.

<sup>22</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>23</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Major Marvin, E. Harris, 36th Division Assistant G-3 for Transformation (TXARNG), telephone interview by the author, 6 September 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>26</sup>Ingram.

<sup>27</sup>Dukes.

<sup>28</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>29</sup>Harris.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Dukes.

<sup>32</sup>Harris.

<sup>33</sup>Mr. Joseph Nolan, First Army (DCS G-5), telephone interview by the author, 11 September 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This process [of change] is never employed effectively unless it is driven by high-quality leadership.<sup>1</sup>

John P. Kotter

#### Introduction

This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section is the findings section comprised of the answers to the secondary research questions: What are the critical ARNG BCT (manning, equipping, and training) problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN? These answers are the foundation for establishing a recommendation to help ARNG BCT commanders evaluate their strategies in the ARFORGEN model.

The second section is the findings not articulated in research section. This section identifies critical requirements for success that must be met in order for the ARFORGEN model to accomplish the task of creating an ARNG operational reserve force. These critical success requirements are not as much of an issue with AC BCTs but cannot be assumed for ARNG BCTs.

The third section is the recommendation section. This section recommends nine attributes that will help ARNG BCT commanders evaluate their strategies for success in preparing their units in the ARFORGEN model. Once these attributes are described, the thesis recommends the use of transformational leadership to implement the ARNG BCT strategy using these key attributes.

## Findings

Full manning is the most critical condition for success in ARFORGEN. Without Soldiers, equipment cannot be operated and training cannot be conducted. Not only is manning the most critical, but it is also the most challenging to solve. Ensuring a unit is fully manned complements the conditions of equipping and training, and enables an ARNG BCT commander to successfully prepare his unit for deployment following the ARFORGEN model.

Analysis reveals four key problems with the manning FIFA related to ARFORGEN. These four manning problems are: (1) home station support, (2) the mobilization system, (3) the CRC replacement system, and (4) negative external perceptions of the ARNG. Home station support used to only be a concern recognized by leaders at the state level. With the increased use of ARNG units in GWOT, this problem is now recognized by leaders up to the FORSCOM level. The National Guard is providing solutions to this problem with the Title 32 Temporary Technician Support policy (see chapter 4 for Title 32 Temporary Technician Support policy details) and FORSCOM is allowing units to mobilize above the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment manning levels to provide extra full time support at home station during deployments. ARNG BCT commanders must utilize these opportunities in their planning to prevent problems with home station support.

The mobilization system is a problem that is also recognized by senior Army leaders. However, this problem involves statutory requirements imposed by Congress and Department of Defense regulations that limit the ability of Army leaders to make decisions. For an ARNG BCT commander to receive a mobilization order,

communication between eight different agencies is involved. These agencies range from the Combatant Commander, Headquarters of the Department of the Army, Congress, FORSCOM, Department of Defense, and NGB. This system is reactive and does not complement the proactive ARFORGEN model for projecting forces. The mobilization system must change to not only to complement ARFORGEN, but to prevent confusion and delays in unit and Soldier notification which impact unit manning.

Another problem beyond ARNG BCT commander and state control is the CRC replacement system. Unlike mobilization, this problem is not fully recognized by all Army leaders. The crux of this problem is the implementation of an AC solution to an ARNG problem. The CRC replacement system is fine for sending AC Soldiers to AC units. But using this system for ARNG Soldiers creates problems because it requires soliciting volunteers as replacements rather than sending nonvolunteer replacements to theater.

Soldiers in the ARNG want to volunteer for units they know. They see the call for service as both a citizen and state responsibility, as well as a community and unit responsibility. Senior ARNG leaders recognize that a by-name request from a deployed ARNG unit carries weight with Soldiers making the volunteer decision. The Army as a whole must recognize these aspects of the ARNG culture in the replacement systems it creates in order to prevent it from detracting from ARFORGEN.

Negative external perceptions must also be recognized as an impact to ARNG Soldier morale and retention. Army policies and decisions that communicate a message of “you are a second-class Soldier” need to be revised or at least explained. When ARNG Soldiers go to an Army installation for training and see the wide disparity in uniforms,

equipment, and facilities, questions about their legitimacy as Soldiers arise. In the implementation of modularity and ARFORGEN the Army is attempting to address these issues, but this move to “balance” the disparity between AC and the ARNG must continue and be reinforced.

The manning constraints related to ARFORGEN consist of: (1) career training and development, (2) the POM cycle, and (3) limited time. Of the three constraints, time is the most common and ARNG BCT commanders have the most influence in managing it. Commanders at all levels must maximize every single training hour throughout the year. Innovative procedures and extra funding is necessary to accomplish the tasks and training necessary in ARFORGEN.

Career training and development is also a commander responsibility. However, the solutions provided by the Army and ARNG involve funding and other resource considerations beyond the authority of ARNG BCT commanders. FORSCOM recognizes this constraint and is building the systems to dedicate the school sets necessary for military occupational specialty training and qualification in the reset and train phase of ARFORGEN. What FORSCOM does not have control of is the funding. The forecasting necessary to get the funding for this training is up to units. This means commanders and staffs must educate these units on how to accomplish this task.

The POM cycle must be understood in order to properly forecast the necessary funding for ARFORGEN. This constraint is shared by all levels of the Army, but because ARNG BCTs have a six-year ARFORGEN model, forecasting becomes even more of a challenge. This constraint involves forecasting funds for ARFORGEN training up to seven years in the future and the resources necessary to conduct the training. Adding

Army Transformation of units (units changing from legacy units to modular units), the ability to forecast is made even more difficult. Greater coordination to properly forecast in the POM cycle is necessary. In addition to more coordination, POM cycle forecast education and training may also be necessary down to the unit level to properly negotiate the POM cycle constraints.

The issues related to manning also involve ARNG BCT commander attention. These issues consist of: (1) lifecycle manning management, (2) enlistment policies and procedures, (3) key leader assignments, (4) Soldier cross-leveling, (5) deployment and redeployment programs, (6) OPTEMPO funds, (7) modularity distracters, (8) local community support activities, (9) leveraging civilian experience, (10) leveraging abilities to improvise, and (11) civilian job and family conflicts. Lifecycle manning management is the process the AC uses to properly man units in the reset and train phase of ARFORGEN. This system does not exist in the ARNG. A future examination of this system may be necessary to see if elements of this AC system can apply to the ARNG. In addition to senior ARNG leaders examining and possibly implementing elements of the lifecycle manning system into the ARNG, ARNG BCT commanders need to familiarize themselves with this system to possibly leverage ideas from this system for their own use.

Enlistment policies and procedures also involve senior ARNG and ARNG BCT commanders. Due to the increased need for new recruits, these policies and procedures now accommodate more enlistees. More liberal stances on drug use and past convictions are examples of how these policies are increasing the pool of available recruits. Commanders and senior leaders must be prepared to meet any challenges that may occur due to these new recruitment policies.

Key leader assignments are one of the most complicated issues for ARNG BCT commanders. How to manage the assignment of Soldiers over a six-year period takes meticulous planning, coordination, and innovation. ARNG BCTs currently going through the reset and train phase are creating by-name tracking systems to track every Soldier in their BCT.<sup>2</sup> This system is not only helping leaders examine who, and when to move Soldiers to new assignments, but it is also providing the benefit of allowing these Soldiers' raters and senior raters the ability to better track career progression and development. ARNG BCT commanders need to examine their existing assignment systems and create more innovative solutions to best complement the ARFORGEN model.

ARNG BCTs are not the only agencies examining the key leader assignment issue. FORSCOM is examining the possibility of creating a second R-Date for ARNG BCTs half way through ARFORGEN. This second R-Date will act as a transition point from one BCT command to another and help communicate this milestone for planning purposes. But have all of the second and third order effects been examined? One effect may be a loss of accountability. With this second R-Date, a transition system may be necessary to mitigate any issues with accountability and communicate the urgency of seamlessly transferring authority half way through the ARFORGEN process.

FORSCOM is also involved with the issue of soldier-cross leveling. The ARNG availability model is the coordination tool that not only tells where ARNG BCTs are in the ARFORGEN process, but it also helps senior leaders create solutions for issues, such as soldier cross-leveling. By using the ARNG availability model, ARNG BCT

commanders can observe what other sister units are available for resourcing against and understand which sister units may request resources from them for GWOT.

Another issue that ARNG BCT commanders must leverage is the deployment and redeployment programs that exist. The SSCRA protections and benefits that are afforded to Soldiers must be fully understood and communicated to Soldiers. This law is a great retention tool and provides the commander with a means to garner broader support with family members.

The USERRA is another law that can leverage broad-based support. Soldiers and their families currently enjoy the most protection this law has ever had. Congress is recognizing the need to increase the strength of this law, but there are still cases of employers not meeting the needs of GWOT veterans. ARNG BCT commanders have the responsibility to mitigate these problems, and senior leaders must continue to examine the effectiveness of this law to make recommendations to Congress.

Two other deployment and redeployment programs that must be leveraged are the COTTAD and TTAD systems. Both systems allow ARNG Soldiers the opportunity to remain on active duty after their mobilization time has expired. These programs provide more available Soldiers to the force, but also entail Soldiers possibly leaving their units. To leverage the benefits of these systems, ARNG BCT commanders need to work with their state and other states to utilize these Soldiers for their manning needs. At the same time, policies and procedures also have to be implemented for Soldiers who wish to leave their units under COTTAD and TTAD contracts.

But ARNG BCT commanders are not the only leaders that must examine the COTTAT and TTAD programs. Senior leaders up to the Department of Defense level



must examine how these programs are managed and operate. The present system to request and receive approval of a COTTAD or TTAD contract is convoluted and time intensive. Soldiers and their units are experiencing never ending changes to the administrative procedures, and approval deadlines for notifying Soldiers are being missed. These problems create unnecessary consternation with manning plans, Soldiers, and families. Senior leaders, from the Department of Defense on down, need to streamline this process and increase the response time in notifying Soldiers and their families as to the status of their requests.

Another opportunity that must be leveraged are the available high OPTEMPO funds. These funds are becoming more widely dispersed due to the needs of GWOT. However, these are targeted funds. Only specific types of units are receiving these funds and state Adjutants General are fighting to get more.<sup>3</sup> ARNG BCT commanders must examine the requirements of these funds and work with their Adjutant General to either request these funds or work to change the requirements of these funds in order to qualify for this money.

A huge issue distracting from ARFORGEN is modularity. Many units in the ARNG are converting from one type of BCT to another (for example, heavy to light and visa-versa). ARNG BCTs currently going through this conversion process see modularity as their main effort. Soldiers and leaders are dedicating most of their efforts and resources in confronting the requirements and tasks associated with conversion and have little time to think about what they view as the longer-range requirements of ARFORGEN.<sup>4</sup> ARNG BCT commanders must work to keep ARFORGEN in the minds of their Soldiers. A sense of urgency for ARFORGEN is losing out to the demands of

modularity. It is incumbent upon ARNG BCT commanders and their leaders to create a sense of urgency for ARFORGEN before its legitimacy is questioned.

Analysis has also revealed that traditional ARNG issues such as local community support activities, civilian job experience, the competency of improvising, and civilian job conflicts still remain with ARFORGEN. Local community support activities are still an opportunity for ARNG BCT commanders to leverage for success in ARFORGEN. Commanders must include local leaders and their support to create a coalition necessary for success in ARFORGEN.

The benefit of Soldier civilian occupational experience and improvising skills are another traditional opportunity that must be leveraged. ARNG BCT commanders and subordinate leaders must leverage these abilities to maximize effectiveness. Utilizing these skills allows commanders the ability to not only accomplish tasks, but also creates a sense of ownership for Soldiers and helps in the understanding of their role in the transformational vision of ARFORGEN.

The traditional ARNG issue of civilian job conflicts must also be mitigated. This issue is a constant concern to families, Soldiers, and their leaders. Such an issue is implied with part-time Soldiers, but the success of ARFORGEN depends on leaders mitigating this issue and including employers in a guiding coalition. Coalitions such as these form the backbone of transformational organizations.

The equipping condition is also important for success in ARFORGEN. Analysis reveals that the equipping condition is contingent on successful integration of new equipment into units going through conversion. ARNG BCT commanders cannot wait until all of their new equipment arrives and is trained on before creating their

ARFORGEN plan. Commanders must leverage the traditional National Guard ability to improvise in order to do both tasks (ARFORGEN and conversion) at the same time.

Also impacting the equipping condition is the issue of stay-behind equipment. Congress assigned the responsibility of this issue to the Department of Defense, but ARNG leaders need to keep abreast of the status of this issue and make recommendations to address it. ARNG BCT commanders still need to hold their superiors accountable for finding solutions to the stay-behind equipment issue and senior military leaders need to do the same with the Department of Defense.

The training condition is second in priority for successful implementation of ARFORGEN. Manning has the most impact, but training gives ARFORGEN its legitimacy. By working with First Army to create solid training plans, conduct preparation and execution of these plans, and coordinate the assessment of ARFORGEN training, ARNG BCT commanders will be successful.

The ARFORGEN model also gives focus to all agencies involved with ARNG training. This focus includes everything from individual, collective, and leader training, to equipment, facilities, and resources. But to remain focused, the mobilization system must complement ARFORGEN. As long as the ready-for-what is visualized and described properly by strategic Army leaders, ARFORGEN can remain properly focused. ARNG BCT commanders must stay involved with the impacts of mission changes that may affect their units so pre- and postmobilization activities are synchronized.

#### Findings not Articulated in Research

The research findings articulated the critical problems, constraints, and issues for ARNG BCTs in the ARFORGEN model. These findings illustrate the priority of

manning for success in ARFORGEN, but do not identify requirements, which are critical for success in this model. Without meeting these critical success requirements, ARNG BCTs will not be successful in ARFORGEN.

For ARNG BCTs to be successful in ARFORGEN, three critical requirements must be met. The first critical success requirement is the need to maintain command teams throughout ARFORGEN. The findings already discussed and addressed the issue of managing key leader assignments. What was not addressed was the situation which could occur if command teams fail or are not established early and maintained throughout the ARFORGEN model from these key leader assignments. If a cohesive and effective command team is not established early and maintained, then a negative climate or dysfunctional command structure will ensue.

The second critical success requirement is soldier career progression throughout the ARFORGEN period. The findings articulated the constraints existing with career training and development and how to mitigate this constraint. However, simply getting Soldiers trained and qualified is not enough for retention. Soldiers want to be promoted, which under the current ARNG promotion system means finding a way to move these Soldiers from one position to another within a six-year period and not lose expertise and team cohesion throughout the ARFORGEN model.

The third and most difficult critical success requirement is preventing Soldier attrition from impacting the BCT in ARFORGEN. This means that once a cohesive and effective team and unit is established, it is maintained throughout ARFORGEN without the necessity of rebuilding these teams and units in the middle of the process. The ARFORGEN model is based on the AC assumption that once Soldiers get to their units,

they will stay in these units until the end of ARFORGEN. For the ARNG, this assumption is quite frequently not the case and it is incumbent upon commanders, states, and the ARNG to put systems in place to address this requirement.

### Recommendations

For ARNG BCT commanders to formulate strategies for successful preparation of their units in the ARFORGEN model, evaluation criteria are necessary to analyze each strategy. To accomplish this task, this thesis recommends using the nine attributes of ARNG BCT ARFORGEN success (see figure 9). Using these attributes gives ARNG BCT commanders and other agencies a focused approach to making recommended courses of action to succeed in the ARFORGEN model.



Figure 9. The Nine Attributes for Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams Army Force Generation Success: ARNG PLAYS

ARNG BCT commanders face two major challenges in successfully preparing units in the ARFORGEN model. The first challenge is addressing the problems, constraints, and issues necessary to accomplish all tasks and milestones in the ARFORGEN model. The second, and most difficult challenge, is meeting the critical success requirements in order to keep units and teams in tack throughout the ARFORGEN process. Research indicates that the Army and ARNG have established or are establishing systems to meet the first challenge, but has not adequately addressed the second challenge. For this reason, the critical success requirements must be combined with the factors that accomplish the tasks and milestones of the ARFORGEN model in order to form the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in this model. However, it is through transformational leadership that ARNG BCT commanders must institute these attributes in their organizations for whatever strategy they chose for ARFORGEN success.

Based on the combination of critical success requirements and necessary tasks and milestones, there are nine attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model. These nine attributes are the following: (1) attrition mitigation, (2) relevant Soldier progression, (3) normalized [stabilized] command teams, (4) guard mobilization management, (5) POM cycle management, (6) lifecycle manning management, (7) ARNG legitimacy, (8) year-round training integration, and (9) synchronized unit conversion. These nine attributes constitute a comprehensive list of evaluation criteria for ARNG BCT commanders to analyze courses of action to successfully prepare their units in the ARFORGEN model.

The first and most difficult attribute is the mitigation of Soldier attrition. This attribute is more than just recruiting and retention programs. It is the ability to meet the critical success requirement of preventing Soldier attrition taking into account the factors of civilian job and family conflicts, utilizing or gaining access to OPTEMPO funds, and examining enlistment policies and procedures that impact recruiting and retention. The attrition mitigation factor is the glue that holds the ARNG BCT together throughout the ARFORGEN process.

The second attribute is relevant soldier career progression for both Soldiers and units. For Soldiers, the elements of career training and development, leveraging civilian experience, and leveraging the ability to improvise must be incorporated into the soldier career progression system. For units, soldier career progression means having the right people in place to accomplish the mission. Both Soldier and unit needs must be accommodated in order to have relevant soldier career progression for success in the ARFORGEN model.

The third element necessary for success of ARNG BCTs in the ARFORGEN model is normalized command teams. This critical success requirement takes prior planning and coordination with agencies throughout the Army and ARNG. Once these command teams are established (normalized), every effort must be made to support them and keep them in place.

Guard mobilization management is the forth attribute for ARNG BCT ARFORGEN success. Research has indicated several key components to this attribute. Among these components are: (1) home station support, (2) AMOPES, (3) the CRC replacement system, (4) deployment and redeployment programs, and (5) local

community support activities. Each of these components must be incorporated in any program or plan that creates the guard mobilization management system.

A difficult yet important part of keeping any Army unit functioning is funding. POM cycle management is the ability to keep ARNG BCTs proactive in meeting the needs of its units. This is done through POM cycle training and tracking in order to provide schools and training events necessary for accomplishing the tasks and milestones in the ARFORGEN model.

Manning units consists of both attrition management and lifecycle manning management. Discussed is the necessity of retaining and recruiting Soldiers. Lifecycle manning management properly manages Soldiers once in the unit throughout the ARFORGEN process. This system complements the needs of soldier progression by managing key leader assignments and also complements the guard mobilization management system by utilizing the cross-leveling of Soldiers to meet manning requirements. Such a system needs to be established for each ARNG BCT and the ARNG as a whole.

The attribute of ARNG legitimacy complements several other important attributes. Attrition takes place when ARNG Soldiers feel disenfranchised when compared to their AC counterparts. When participating in training events or even while supported by AC Soldiers, nothing is more discouraging than hearing how they are not “real” Soldiers or just “weekend warriors.” This mentality must stop and likewise ARNG leaders must ensure this view of the ARNG is abolished through discipline and training.

Of course training is a central part of the ARFORGEN process. To accomplish all of the necessary training events and requirements of ARFORGEN, year-round training



integration with 1A and its Training Support Brigades is necessary. Along with the role of 1A is the role of the Army's training institutions. Efforts to maintain knowledge of the most current doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures are essential for success.

ARNG BCT leaders must leverage all aspects of the Army's training assets including combat training centers, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and various publications that add to an understanding of the contemporary operational environment. This "above and beyond" approach to training is necessary for mission success and to gain legitimacy amongst Army peers.

Also impacting ARNG BCTs is unit conversion. To mitigate this impact, a synchronized unit conversion system must be established throughout the Army. This includes fielding of equipment, modularity education, and the training necessary to operate all new equipment as part of unit conversion on the front end of the reset and train phase of ARFORGEN. ARNG BCTs currently experiencing unit conversion see this as their main effort. By better synchronizing unit conversion across the Army, ARNG BCTs will not lose sight of the fact that ARFORGEN is how they ready themselves for the GWOT.

Transformational leadership serves to change the status quo by articulating to followers the problems in the current system and providing a compelling vision of what the organization could be.<sup>5</sup> The nine attributes of ARNG BCT ARFORGEN success is the articulation of problems in the current system. The next step is for ARNG BCT commanders and their leaders to formulate a vision and strategy to lead their organizations through the ARFORGEN process. This leadership process is the catalyst

for change and surrounds all actions involved with accomplishing the requirements of these nine attributes.

### Summary and Conclusions

This chapter provided the findings and recommendations to enable one to evaluate any strategy used for ARFORGEN success. From the analysis conducted in chapter 4, this chapter articulated findings that answered the secondary research questions related to the manning, equipping, and training problems, constraints, and issues related to ARFORGEN. Also presented were critical success requirements not articulated from the findings. Based on these findings and requirements, the answer to the primary research question was presented: What are the key attributes for ARNG BCT success in the ARFORGEN model?

Since 11 September, the reliance of the Army on the ARNG has dramatically increased. No longer does the Army have the luxury of only utilizing the ARNG as a strategic reserve. It now must transform the ARNG into an operational reserve and utilize the ARNG in order to meet the demands of GWOT. ARFORGEN was created, in part, to make this change from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve force possible. However, it is imperative that leaders transform their organizations and meet the requirements of the nine attributes for success in order for ARNG PLAY[S] in the GWOT to succeed.

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<sup>1</sup>John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 20.

<sup>2</sup>McGinnus.

<sup>3</sup>Ingram.

<sup>4</sup>Harris.

<sup>5</sup>This thesis accepts the definition of Transformation Leadership using: R. N. Lussier and C. F. Achua, *Leadership: Theory, Application, Skill Development* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson-West, 2004), 356.

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